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COMPROMISING EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION 
ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON LGBT WORKERS 
ERIK S. THOMPSON* 
Abstract: On November 7, 2013, the U.S. Senate passed the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (“2013 ENDA”), a bill that attempted to incorporate both 
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 2013 ENDA was an important initiative that ad-
dressed a long history of employment discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisex-
ual, and transgendered employees. The bill, however, provided a broad exemp-
tion for religiously affiliated organizations operating in secular fields. This reli-
gious exemption excluded a significant number of organizations hiring secular-
in-function employees from the bill’s prohibition of discriminatory practices. 
Although Congress dismissed the 2013 ENDA in September 2014, the history of 
the bill suggests that future attempts by Congress to pass a similar antidiscrimi-
nation bill will likely offer the same broad exemption for secular-in-function but 
religious-in-name organizations. This Note examines the religious exemption is-
sue and suggests that religiously affiliated but secular-in-function organizations 
be subject to a bona fide occupational qualification to enable them to practice 
their faith without undermining the very purpose of the proposed legislation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2013, Mark Zmuda, vice principal at Eastside Catholic High 
School near Seattle, Washington, reluctantly resigned his position after the 
high school’s administration suggested that he leave the school.1 The former 
vice principal was well regarded among students and other faculty at Eastside 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Comments Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–
2015. 
 1 Carol Kuruvilla, Fired Gay Vice Principal Fighting Back Against Seattle-Area Catholic School, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 8, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ousted-gay-vice-
principal-fighting-back-catholic-school-fired-article-1.1715326; Michael Paulson, Gay Marriages 
Confront Catholic School Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at A1. In an interview with the New York 
Daily News, Mr. Zmuda stated that the administration of Eastside Catholic High School offered him 
an option to either divorce his new husband or be terminated from his position as vice principal. Ku-
ruvilla, supra. 
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Catholic.2 Nonetheless, once the administration became aware that he had mar-
ried his partner, another male, it asked for Mr. Zmuda’s resignation.3 
Employment practices that target lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gendered (LGBT) employees are not uncommon, especially among religious 
sects whose tenets are particularly supportive of protecting a traditional hetero-
sexual lifestyle.4 When Eastside Catholic discharged Mr. Zmuda, he joined a 
great number of LGBT employees across the United States who face sexuality-
based harassment or who otherwise suffer under discriminatory employment 
practices.5 Although some states have addressed these issues, many states do 
not provide comprehensive protection from employment discrimination based 
on either sexual orientation or gender identity grounds, while other states have 
no protections for LGBT employees at all.6 Additionally, LGBT workers have 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Paulson, supra note 1. Following Mr. Zmuda’s resignation, students at Eastside Catholic 
organized rallies in support of him, protested outside City Hall, and petitioned the school to change its 
policies. Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See id.; Statement of Archbishop J. Peter Sartain regarding Eastside Catholic High School Per-
sonnel Action (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.eastsidecatholic.org/ftpimages/528/download/download_
986757.pdf (supporting the rights of Eastside Catholic to terminate Mark Zmuda in accordance with 
the free exercise of its Catholic mission and the belief in the sacredness of traditional marriage); see 
also Dave Bakke, Wedding Announcement Costs Gay Woman Job at Benedictine, ST. J.-REG. (Spring-
field, Ill.), Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.sj-r.com/article/20101110/News/311109960; Melissa Pinion-
Whitt, Glendora Catholic School Dismisses Gay Rancho Cucamonga Teacher After Publicized Wed-
ding, SAN BERNARDINO CNTY. SUN, Jul. 30, 2013, http://www.sbsun.com/general-
news/20130731/glendora-catholic-school-dismisses-gay-rancho-cucamonga-teacher-after-publicized-
wedding; Alissa Widman, St. Mary Band Director Fired for Gay Wedding Plans, SANDUSKY REG., 
Jan. 11, 2014, http://www.sanduskyregister.com/article/st-mary-band-director-fired/5163951 (describ-
ing band director’s resignation from Sandusky Central Catholic School after his wedding to another 
male, noting that all employees at the school “must sign a contract stating they will live a lifestyle 
according to the Catholic faith”). 
 5 See Jamie M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Dis-
crimination Survey, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 
53 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf (reporting that forty-
seven percent of transgendered employees felt they were directly discriminated against in the hiring 
process); Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination & Its 
Effects on LGBT People, WILLIAMS INST. 1 (July 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Sears-Mallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf (reporting that twenty-seven percent of 
LGBT employees faced discrimination or harassment in the workplace). 
 6 See Jerome Hunt, A State-by-State Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and Policies, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND 3–4 (2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2013) 
(prohibiting all employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, so as to 
include transgendered employees within the protected class), with MICH. EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 
2003-24 (2003), http://www.michigan.gov/formergovernors/0,4584,7-212-57648_36898-83560—
,00.html (ordering a ban on public employment discrimination practices only based upon sexual orien-
tation and gender identity and leaving out protections for transgendered employees). 
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little or no remedy under federal law.7 In 1964, Congress introduced the Civil 
Rights Act, which included Title VII, a provision designed to combat employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin.8 
Despite the non-discriminatory spirit of Title VII, federal courts have long held 
that it does not protect LGBT employees against workplace discrimination 
based on their LGBT identity.9 
Mr. Zmuda’s termination based on his sexual orientation and similar or-
deals faced by other LGBT individuals are not simply stories of sexuality-
based discrimination.10 They are instead a reflection of the tension between 
LGBT employment rights and religious interests.11 Many religious groups in 
the United States openly and vocally disapprove of homosexuality, oppose gay 
marriage, and generally disfavor any sexual identity that diverges from tradi-
tional heterosexuality.12 Moreover, as a result of their religious affiliation, 
many organizations offering secular and general public services such as high 
schools, universities, hospitals, and nursing homes, have the power to hire and 
fire employees based upon their sexual identities and preferences.13 As illus-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (making no mention of LGBT workers 
as a protected class); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3rd Cir. 2001) 
(“Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such harassment [because of 
sexual orientation].”). 
 8 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 
2391 (1964). The text of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explains that it “is designed primarily to protect 
and provide more effective means to enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States. In furtherance of these objectives the bill . . . establishe[d] a Federal Equal Employment 
Commission designed to eliminate discriminatory employment practices by business, labor unions, or 
employment agencies . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 9 See, e.g., Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265 (stating that Title VII does not protect gay or lesbian employ-
ees from discriminatory employment practices); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
(dismissing claim of discrimination because Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 10 See Kuruvilla, supra note 1; Paulson, supra note 1. 
 11 See Kuruvilla, supra note 1; Paulson, supra note 1. 
 12 See Bruce W. Dunne, Homosexuality in the Middle East: An Agenda for Historical Research, 
12 ARAB STUD. Q. 55, 66 (1990) (noting that some Muslim scholars suggest the Quran’s prohibition 
of sodomy also prohibits homosexuality); Yoel H. Khan, Judaism and Homosexuality: The Tradition-
alist/Progressive Debate, 18 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 49, 50–51 (1989) (highlighting that some tradi-
tionalist believers in Judaism disapprove of homosexuality); Eric M. Rodriguez & Suzanne C. Ouel-
lette, Gay and Lesbian Christians: Homosexuality and Religious Identity Integration in the Members 
and Participants of a Gay-Positive Church, 39 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 333, 333 (2000) (noting 
that seventy-two percent of surveyed Christian-denomination churches in the United States con-
demned homosexuals and homosexuality based upon religious beliefs); Marc L. Rubinstein, Gay 
Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argument That Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate 
the Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1603, 1606 (1995) (illustrating that opponents of gay-
rights legislation largely proffer arguments based upon religious condemnation of homosexuality). 
 13 See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 741 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a non-profit 
organization offering soup kitchen and other welfare services to the poor qualified for a Title VII 
religious exemption because the organization was founded under religious ideals); Saeemodarae v. 
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trated by Mr. Zmuda’s case, these religiously affiliated organizations may le-
gally exercise this power to the detriment of LGBT employees.14 
On November 7, 2013, the U.S. Senate passed the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (“2013 ENDA”), a bill that incorporated both sexual orien-
tation and gender identity into Title VII as protected classes.15 The 2013 EN-
DA included a broad exemption for religious organizations, which encom-
passed religious affiliates that engage in strictly secular activities.16 If the 2013 
ENDA had been passed into law, these religiously affiliated organizations and 
institutions would be permitted to continue to make employment decisions 
based on sexuality and marital status, much as Eastside Catholic did in Zmu-
da’s case.17 
Despite the 2013 ENDA’s passage in the Senate, the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives referred the 2013 ENDA to committee, and on September 17, 
2014, the House Committee on Rules voted to discharge the bill from consid-
eration—a vote that signaled the end for the 2013 ENDA.18 The failure of both 
houses to agree on the necessity of the LGBT employment protections contin-
ues a historical trend; however, members of Congress continually renew their 
efforts to pass a bill of this type and such a bill is likely to pass in the future.19 
                                                                                                                           
Mercy Health Servs.-Iowa Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1043 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that a 
Catholic hospital is exempt under Title VII’s religious exemption despite providing medical services 
to the community at large); E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (W.D. 
Wash. 1992) (Presbyterian retirement home held exempt from Title VII religious discrimination pro-
hibition); McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (holding that the 
Salvation Army is exempt as a religious organization); Bakke, supra note 4; Paulson, supra note 1; 
Widman, supra note 4. 
 14 See Bakke, supra note 4; Paulson, supra note 1; Widman, supra note 4. 
 15 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate November 7, 2013); Jeremy W. Peters, Bill Advances to Outlaw 
Discrimination Against Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2013, at A10 (pointing out that the basis for the 
ENDA is to add to the classes protected under Title VII). 
 16 See S. 815 § 6 (providing for the same religious exemption encoded in the Religious Organiza-
tion Exemption for discrimination on the basis of religion of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). 
 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); S. 815 § 6; Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The Collision of Religious 
Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV. 5, 1201, 1201−02 (1989); 
Paulson, supra note 1. 
 18 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755 113th Cong. (2013) (referred to 
committee); H.R. Res. 678, 113th Cong. (2014) (providing for the consideration or discharge of S. 
815); H.R. Doc. No. 011, 113th Cong. (2014) (documenting the committee vote and subsequent dis-
charge of S. 815); Peters, supra note 15. 
 19 See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755; (referred to committee); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011) (dying in committee); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009) (dying in committee); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007) (passing in House 
alone but without protection for transgender employees); see also Editorial, Toward Ending Work-
place Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at A26 (arguing that the passage of the ENDA in the 
Senate is a significant step towards passing the ENDA in the near future). 
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The 2013 ENDA, nonetheless, required a debate about the construction of a 
religious exemption sufficient to allow free religious expression but narrow 
enough to maintain the integrity of the 2013 ENDA’s protection of LGBT in-
terests.20 
Part I of this Note discusses Title VII and the extent to which it provides 
protections to LGBT employees. Part I additionally outlines a brief history of 
congressional attempts to implement a ban on LGBT discrimination in the 
workplace and the historical developments leading up to the introduction of the 
2013 ENDA. Part II analyzes the problems presented by the religious exemp-
tion as it was formulated in the 2013 ENDA and compares the religious ex-
emption to others implemented by various state non-discrimination statutes. 
Part III argues for the implementation of a “religious-in-function” categorical 
test for determining which religiously based organizations ought to be exempt 
from the antidiscrimination law. A categorical test would best account for the 
commercial realities of many religiously affiliated organizations that operate 
almost entirely to provide secular goods or services. Such a test is necessary to 
ensure that large, secular-in-function employers open their doors to LGBT em-
ployees while still providing an exemption for religious-in-function organiza-
tions. 
I. HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AGAINST 
LGBT EMPLOYEES AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
In 1964, the United States adopted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“the 
Act”) to combat rampant employment discrimination on the basis of race, reli-
gion, national origin, and sex.21 Despite the historic achievements of the Act to 
promote equality and prohibit discriminatory practices, the current employ-
ment provisions of Title VII do not prohibit private employers from discrimi-
nating on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation or gender identity.22 In 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See S. 815 § 6; Steven H. Aden & Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Catch or Release? The Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act’s Exemption for Religious Organizations, 11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST 
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 4, 4 (2010). 
 21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 2391 
(1964) (“The [Civil Rights Act of 1964] is designed primarily to protect and provide more effective 
means to enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. In furtherance 
of these objectives the bill . . . establishes a Federal Equal Employment Commission designed to elim-
inate discriminatory employment practices by business, labor unions, or employment agencies . . . .”). 
 22 See Title VII § 2000e-2(a)–(n); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Hug, J., dissenting) (stating that if Title VII is to protect sexual orientation as a class, Congress 
must affirmatively enact the protection); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 
(3rd Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII does not 
protect against discrimination the basis of sexual orientation because Congress expressly rejected 
previous bills that would include sexual orientation as a protected class); OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & 
COUNSEL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, App. B Tbls. B-36, B-37 
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the past twenty years, members of Congress have repeatedly sought to remedy 
this issue by proposing federal statutes that would extend Title VII protections 
to gay and transgendered persons.23 On November 7, 2013, by a vote of sixty-
four to thirty-two, the U.S. Senate passed the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act (“2013 ENDA”), the first bill tailored towards prohibiting employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity to survive 
a vote in either house of Congress.24 Although the House of Representatives 
recently terminated its consideration of the 2013 ENDA, thus halting any fur-
ther progress of enacting the legislation in this term, the passage of the 2013 
ENDA in the Senate provided momentum for the continuing push to proscribe 
discriminatory employment practices against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgendered (LGBT) employees.25 
A. Title VII Coverage and Protections 
In the midst of the remarkable domestic unrest over inequality and a call 
for civil rights in the 1960s, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
address the enduring mark of racial oppression and prejudice.26 Congress in-
                                                                                                                           
(2013) (demonstrating equality improvements in private sector employment as a result of nearly tri-
pling the employment of women and doubling the employment of black employees since the inception 
of Title VII). 
 23 See e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811 (not passed by either house of 
Congress); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584 (not passed by either house of 
Congress); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685 (passing in House—without 
protection for transgender employees, but failing to pass in the Senate); Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995) (not passed by either house of Congress); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994) (not passed by either 
house of Congress). 
 24 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815 (as passed by Senate November 7, 
2013); Peters, supra note 15. The term “gender identity” means the manner in which an individual 
identifies his or her sexuality, and the term includes appearances, mannerisms, and any other gender-
related characteristics that may or may not be specifically related to the individual’s designated sex at 
birth. See S. 815 § 3(a)(7). The purpose of including “gender identity” is to extend the act unambigu-
ously to transgendered employees and other employees who do not identify as a traditional gender. 
See Hearing on H.R. 3017, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Stuart J. Ishimaru, Acting Chairman, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission). 
 25 See H.R. Res. 678, 113th Cong. (2014) (providing for the consideration or discharge of S. 815); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755 113th Cong. (2013) (referred to commit-
tee); The Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2013: Hearing on S. 815 Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong. 2 (2013); H.R. Doc. No. 011, 113th Cong. 
(2014) (documenting the committee vote and subsequent discharge of S. 815); Editorial, supra note 
19. 
 26 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Julius L. Chambers & 
Barry Goldstein, Title VII: The Continuing Challenge of Establishing Fair Employment Practices, 49 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 12 (1986). Following a contentious battle in the Senate, Congress resolved 
to enact Title VII and the whole of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an effort to end racial conflicts and 
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cluded a guarantee of equal employment opportunity within Title VII, which 
established a comprehensive and absolute prohibition of discriminatory em-
ployment practices based on race or color.27 Title VII also established equal 
opportunity employment guarantees for other traditionally oppressed groups, 
including women, persons of differing national origins, and members of non-
majority religions.28 Since its inception, Title VII has assisted in promoting 
employment equality.29 
Despite Title VII’s successes, the Act notably excludes from its protection 
a distinct class of the American labor market, a class of citizens that has also 
faced tremendous prejudice and oppression in the workforce.30 U.S. federal 
courts have construed “sex,” one of the protected classes under Title VII, to 
exclude sexual orientation or transgendered status.31 For example, in Simonton 
v. Runyon, the plaintiff, an employee of the U.S. Postal Service, brought a Title 
VII claim against his employer, alleging abuse based upon his sexual orienta-
tion.32 The plaintiff argued that Title VII’s guarantee that employees would be 
free of “discrimination based on ‘sex’ include[d] discrimination based on sexu-
al orientation.”33 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument because Congress had repeatedly attempted but failed to 
                                                                                                                           
the legacy of racial oppression left in the wake of slavery and the Jim Crow laws. See Chambers & 
Goldstein, supra, at 26. According to President John F. Kennedy, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a 
conscientious effort to “settle the . . . matter . . . [of racial oppression] in the courts [rather] than on the 
streets . . . .” Id. 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 28 Id. Unlike the Title’s unconditional bar on race-based employment practices, however, Title 
VII provided for a limited bona fide occupational qualification exemption for preferential practices on 
the basis of sex, national origin, or religion. Id. § 2000e-2(e). A bona fide occupational qualification 
exemption allows an employer to select employees on the basis of the employee belonging to a partic-
ular class of individuals (i.e. male or female) so long as the employer can show that membership of 
said class is necessary for the employee to fulfill the duties his occupation requires. See Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (holding that being male was a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for a “contact guard” in a male prison ward for extremely violent sexual convicts who often tried 
to assault female guards). Discriminatory practices on the basis of religion are further exempt from 
Title VII prohibitions under a broadly construed religious exemption clause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
Notably, the religious exemption clause as it currently applies to “discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion” would equally apply to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity 
under Section 6 of the ENDA of 2013. See S. 815 § 6 (exempting religious entities under same ex-
emption as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)). 
 29 See generally OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & COUNSEL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 22, 
App. B Tbls. B-36, B-37 (illustrating the increased rates of employment among classes protected by 
Title VII). 
 30 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (not mentioning sexual orientation as a protected class); Bibby, 260 
F.3d at 265; Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35. 
 31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2l; see Rene, 305 F.3d at 1076 (Hug, J., dissenting); Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265; 
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35. 
 32 Simonton, 232 F.3d at 34. 
 33 Id. at 35. 
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pass a bill that would include sexual orientation within Title VII’s protec-
tions.34 The court interpreted the congressional failings to be evidence of legis-
lative intent to exclude sexual orientation from Title VII.35 Accordingly, the 
court held that “[b]ecause the term ‘sex’ in Title VII refers only to membership 
in a class delineated by gender, and not to sexual affiliation, Title VII does not 
proscribe discrimination because of sexual orientation.” 36 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to a similar conclu-
sion in Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co. when it held that the lan-
guage of Title VII did not support a cause of action for discrimination solely on 
the basis of sexual orientation.37 The plaintiff in Bibby brought both harass-
ment and wrongful termination claims against his employer, arguing that he 
was discriminated against for being homosexual.38 Although the Third Circuit 
stated that “[h]arassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our 
society,” it went on to hold that harassment claims are only actionable under 
Title VII on the basis of sex, defined strictly by one’s biological gender rather 
than sexual orientation.39 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the plain-
tiff’s claim was not actionable.40 
Discrimination claims on the basis of sexual identity present a more com-
plex issue for the courts, which collectively have not adopted a uniform stance 
on whether discrimination claims on the basis of sexual identity are actionable 
under Title VII.41 “Sexual identity” refers to one’s personal identification with 
a particular gender or sex.42 Congress specifically construed the term sexual 
identity in the 2013 ENDA to include transgendered employees as well as oth-
er persons who may not identify as a member of a traditional gender or sex.43 
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that Title VII does not provide protection to transsexuals.44 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 36. The Second Circuit held “because of sex” meant “sex” in a strict biologically deline-
ated sense. See id. 
 37 Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265. 
 38 Id. at 260. 
 39 See id. at 261, 264. 
 40 Id. at 265. 
 41 Compare Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
transsexual is not a protected class under Title VII), with Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 
307 (D.D.C. 2008) (suggesting that a traditional definition of “sex” is “no longer a tenable approach” 
to interpreting Title VII). 
 42 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(7) (2013) (stating 
that “the term ‘gender identity’ means the gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other 
gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s designated 
sex at birth”). 
 43 See S. Rep. No. 113-105, at 2, 15 (2013). 
 44 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222. 
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Despite a clear showing that the Etsitty plaintiff was terminated solely due to 
the employer’s concerns about the plaintiff’s transition to a female, the Tenth 
Circuit strictly interpreted Title VII’s definition of sex to mean only its “com-
mon and traditional interpretation.”45 The court concluded that sex based dis-
crimination under Title VII is not actionable because a plaintiff is trans-
gendered.46 
Etsitty was distinguished to a limited extent by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia in Schroer v. Billington.47 In that case, the plaintiff, a 
male applicant for a position in the Library of Congress, was overwhelmingly 
qualified for the position, but the employer rejected the prospective employee’s 
application subsequent to his transition to a woman.48 The transgendered plain-
tiff asserted that Title VII protections applied primarily under the sex-
stereotyping theory established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins.49 The Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory permits an 
employee to bring a Title VII sex discrimination claim if the employee was 
subject to workplace harassment or discrimination due to his or her failure to 
conform to gender norms.50 The Schroer court agreed with the plaintiff’s con-
tention that the Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory applied in his case 
and that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff solely because he 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See id. at 1219, 1221 (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
Krystal Etsitty had undergone a male to female sex change following the completion of her training 
and commencement of employment as an operator for the Utah Transit Authority. Id. at 1219. Etsit-
ty’s transition was unquestioned until a manager at UTA expressed concern about Etsitty’s use of 
public restrooms at work. Id. Etsitty was subsequently terminated because of concern over the em-
ployer’s ability to accommodate her restroom needs. Id. 
 46 See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222; see also Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“Congress never considered 
nor intended that [Title VII] apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”); Holloway v. 
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that transsexuals are not protected 
by Title VII because Congress merely intended Title VII to treat men and women equally). 
 47 See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 307–08 (stating that sweeping reinterpretation of “sex” in Title 
VII is not necessary because the transsexual plaintiff was protected on other grounds, but the tradi-
tional interpretation of “sex” is unduly narrow). 
 48 Id. at 295–98. David Schroer, a former serviceman in the U.S. Armed Forces and graduate of 
the National War College with a master’s degree in history, applied for a specialist position with the 
Library of Congress. Id. at 295. Schroer was exceptionally qualified and received the highest inter-
view score of all the candidates for the position. Id. at 296. After learning of Schroer’s intent to un-
dergo a gender transition, the hiring employer expressed concerns over the transition and rejected 
Schroer’s application. Id. at 298–99. 
 49 See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 303, 305; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 
(1989). 
 50 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51. The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was a female 
employee who had been denied partnership at an accounting firm due to her “masculine behavior.” Id. 
at 235. 
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failed to conform to gender norms.51 In its ruling, the Schroer court carved out 
a possible avenue for transsexuals to assert protection under the Title VII “sex” 
framework, stating in dicta that discrimination because of sex encompasses 
those who have converted sexes.52 Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that 
the traditional “anatomical or chromosomal definition of sex remains good law 
. . . .”53 
B. The Effect of Title VII’s Exclusion of LGBT Employees and the Statutory 
Need for the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
The 2013 ENDA sought to address a history of discriminatory practices 
by private and public employers against individuals of varying sexual orienta-
tions and gender identities.54 The bill would have created a nationwide uniform 
prohibition against employment discrimination based on gender identity or 
sexual orientation.55 Because of the lack of uniformity in state-level protec-
tions and little federal protection, the 2013 ENDA would serve to clarify and 
solidify protections for LGBT employees.56 A 2011 study by the Williams In-
stitute reported that up to 27% of gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees be-
lieved that they had been discriminated against or harassed due to their sexual 
orientation.57 Similarly, a joint study conducted in 2011 by the National Center 
for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force report-
ed that 47% of transgendered employees experienced some form of discrimi-
nation or harassment and 26% of transgendered employees believed they were 
fired directly because of their sexual identity.58 
Although several states have begun initiatives to codify employment pro-
tections for gay and transgendered persons, there remains a disparate treatment 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308. The plaintiff in Schroer was successful in demonstrating 
that he was unlawfully discriminated against because of the employer’s fears that plaintiff did not 
conform to traditional gender stereotypes. Id. 
 52 See id. at 305–06. The court presented the following hypothetical: 
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from Christianity to Judaism. 
Imagine too that her employer testifies that he harbors no bias toward either Christians 
or Jews but only ‘converts.’ That would be a clear case of discrimination ‘because of 
religion.’ No court would take seriously the notion that ‘converts’ are not covered by 
the statute. 
Id. at 306. 
 53 See id. at 308. 
 54 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 2(1) (2013). 
 55 See id. at § 2(2). 
 56 See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308; Hunt, 
supra note 6, at 3–4 (citing the non-uniform undertakings of the states to provide employment protec-
tions for LGBT employees). 
 57 See Sears & Mallory, supra note 5, at 1. 
 58 See Grant, supra note 5, at 3. 
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of sexual orientation and gender discrimination claims across the nation.59 Cur-
rently, only sixteen states and the District of Columbia provide full employ-
ment protection, including a complete prohibition of discriminatory practices 
and equitable remedies such as back pay and reinstatement, for employees of 
varying sexual orientations and gender identities.60 Other states provide protec-
tion for sexual orientation alone, some provide partial protection only for pub-
lic employment, and nineteen states provide no statutory protection at all.61 
In an early effort to address a pattern of discriminatory employment prac-
tices against gay and transgendered individuals, Massachusetts Congressman 
Gerry Studds introduced the first Employment Non-Discrimination legislation 
to the House of Representatives in 1994.62 Since then, Congress has consid-
ered several versions of the ENDA;63 however, only the 2007 ENDA passed in 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Hunt, supra note 6 (noting that nineteen states do not afford LGBT employees any em-
ployment protections). Compare N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2010) (prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation but not gender identity), with MICH. EXECUTIVE DI-
RECTIVE NO. 2003-24 (2003), http://www.michigan.gov/formergovernors/0,4584,7-212-57648_368
98-83560—,00.html (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of both gender identity and 
sexual orientation for public employment alone). 
 60 See Hunt, supra note 6, at 3−5 (citing the full list of states that provide employment protections 
for all LGBT employees in both private and public sectors). The Hunt study indicates that California, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts, and thirteen other states have protections in place for gay and 
transgendered persons. Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 
2011); Employment Nondiscrimination Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2014); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2009); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 378-2 (LexisNexis 2010); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, 
§ 3 (2013). 
 61 See M.D. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (LexisNexis 2009) (providing full employment 
protections for sexual orientation alone); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:6 (2009) (providing full 
employment protections for sexual orientation alone); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS. LAW § 296 (providing full 
employment protections for sexual orientation alone). Six states prohibit discrimination based upon 
both sexual orientation and gender identity for public employment only. See, e.g., IND. GOVERNOR’S 
POLICY STATEMENT (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.in.gov/spd/files/gov_policy.pdf (Governor Mitch 
Daniels announced that neither sexual orientation nor gender identity will be considered in state hir-
ing, advancement, development, or termination); KAN. EXECUTIVE ORDER 2007-24 (2007), http://
www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/EO_KS_2007.pdf (Governor Kathleen Sebelius issued an order 
prohibiting any discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in public employment); 
MICH. EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 2003-24 (2003), http://www.michigan.gov/formergovernors/
0,4584,7-212-57648_36898-83560—,00.html (Governor Jennifer Granholm ordered a ban on public 
employment discrimination practices based upon sexual orientation and gender identity). Thirty-one 
states have some sort of employment protection for LGBT employees. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 5 
(noting the states that have no protections in place and no statutory mention of protection for LGBT 
persons). 
 62 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994) (stating that 
the purpose of the bill was to address discriminatory employment practices against LGBT persons). 
 63 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011); Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009); Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007) (passing in the House but without protection for transgender 
employees). 
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the House, due to a compromise that eliminated proposed protections for 
transgendered employees.64 The 2013 ENDA, introduced by Oregon Senator 
Jeff Merkley, was the first bill providing for full Title VII protection for gay, 
lesbian, and transgendered persons to survive a vote in either house of Con-
gress: with some bi-partisan support, it passed the Senate sixty-four to thirty-
two.65 
The 2013 ENDA was not without its own compromises.66 Had the 2013 
ENDA passed the House of Representatives, it would have established that 
discriminating against an employee or firing a candidate on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity is unlawful.67 The 2013 ENDA, however, con-
tained a significantly broad exemption for religious organizations that incorpo-
rates the immunity for religious discrimination in Title VII.68 Title VII states 
that any religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society is 
exempt from the religious discrimination portion of the Act.69 The religious 
exemption in Title VII thus grants a wide range of religiously founded organi-
zations the ability to hire and fire employees on the basis of religion, regard-
less of the nature of the specific activities that those organizations carry out.70 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685; H. amend. 884 to H.R. 3685, 
110th Cong. (2007) (striking “gender identity” from bill); H.R. Res. 793, 110th Cong. (2007) (calling 
for debate on the amendment to strike “gender identity” as a protected class and, ultimately, leading to 
the withdrawal of “gender identity” from the text of the bill). 
 65 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing employment 
protection for all persons on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity). Compare id., 
with S. 811 (providing protection for employees only on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 66 See Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2013: Hearing on S. 815 Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong. 21 (2013) (reporting that inclusion of the reli-
gious exemption was an effort to compromise to earn support for the ENDA from religious leaders). 
 67 See S. 815; see also Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013 H.R. 1755 113th Cong. 
(2013) (referred to Committee). 
 68 See S. 815 § 6(a). This Section provides: 
IN GENERAL.—This Act shall not apply to a corporation, association, educational in-
stitution or institution of learning, or society that is exempt from the religious discrimi-
nation provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) 
pursuant to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e–1(a), 2000e–
2(e)(2)) (referred to in this section as a “religious employer”). 
Id. Compare id. (ENDA religious exemption), with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) (“[The] subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, associa-
tion, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society of its activities.”). 
 69 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 70 Id.; see, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769–70 (2014) (determin-
ing that a closely held for-profit corporation may assert free-exercise claims under the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 741 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
a non-profit organization unaffiliated with any particular Christian denomination is exempt because of 
its close ties to religious tenants and purpose); Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 
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Under the Title VII framework, the 2013 ENDA’s prohibition of discriminatory 
employment practice on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity 
would be inapplicable to any religious corporations, associations, educational 
institutions, or organization of the like.71 
Congress contemplated a narrower construction of the religious exemp-
tion as applied to sexual orientation discrimination in the 2007 version of the 
ENDA.72 In that version, Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank intro-
duced legislation that wholly exempted religious organizations whose primary 
purpose was to proliferate religious doctrine or perform rituals, but exempted 
other religious institutions only to the extent that the employee’s primary du-
ties served a religious purpose or function.73 Representative Frank’s proposal 
advanced a narrower construction than Title VII’s religious exemption, which 
applies broadly to any religious corporation and any employee of such organi-
zations derivatively.74 The 2007 proposal targeted mixed secular and religious 
institutions so that these organizations could not discriminate against gay em-
ployees unless the employees were in positions teaching, supervising, or ex-
pressing religious ideals.75 This particular formulation of a religious exemp-
                                                                                                                           
1021, 1027, 1044 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (finding a Catholic hospital qualified for an exemption under the 
terms of Title VII despite hiring non-Catholic employees and having non-Catholics on its board of 
directors); E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1992) 
(finding a Presbyterian retirement home exempt); McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 
1107 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (finding that the Salvation Army qualified as an exempt religious organization). 
Although Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores is not analogous to discrimination cases, it shows a trend of 
expanding what types of organizations are deemed “religious” for certain exemption statuses. See 134 
S. Ct. 2751, 2769–70. 
 71 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 815 § 6(a), 113th Cong. 
(2013) (incorporating Title VII’s religious exemption into the language of the ENDA). 
 72 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007); Aden & 
Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 4. 
 73 See H.R. 2015 at § 6(a)−(b); Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 4. The 2007 bill’s reli-
gious exemption provided: 
(a) In General.—This Act shall not apply to any of the employment practices of a reli-
gious corporation, association, educational institution, or society which has as its prima-
ry purpose religious ritual or worship or the teaching or spreading of religious doctrine 
or belief. 
(b) Certain Employees.—For any religious corporation, association, educational institu-
tion, or society that is not wholly exempt under subsection (a), this Act shall not apply 
with respect to the employment of individuals whose primary duties consist of teaching 
or spreading religious doctrine or belief, religious governance, supervision of a reli-
gious order, supervision of persons teaching or spreading religious doctrine or belief, or 
supervision or participation in religious ritual or worship. 
H.R. 2015 at § 6(a)−(b). 
 74 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012); H.R. 2015 at § 6(a)−(b) (granting an exemption only to 
religious institutions whose primary goal is the teaching or spreading of religious doctrines). 
 75 See H.R. 2015 at § 6(a)−(b). 
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tion, however, would not have protected LGBT persons employed in general 
administrative roles such as the former vice principal, Mr. Zmuda.76 
The 2007 bill was met with opposition in the House, in part due to the re-
ligious exemption provision’s narrow construction.77 Republican opponents to 
the 2007 bill and religious freedom advocates argued that Title VII should be 
the benchmark for religious exemption status.78 The ENDA of 2007 passed the 
House only after the religious exemption section was amended to reflect the 
boundaries of Title VII.79 The 2007 bill died before it reached the Senate 
floor.80 
Accordingly, the broad exemption found in the 2013 ENDA was a feature 
central to garnering bipartisan support and appeasing religious interests.81 An 
expansive religious exemption provision such as that found in the 2013 EN-
DA, however, may provide a safe harbor for many religiously affiliated institu-
tions engaged in secular business to continue or begin to exhibit discriminatory 
hiring practices at the expense of gay and transgendered employees.82 
II. BALANCING RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION WITH LGBT 
PROTECTION AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
In recent history, religious interests and those advocating for rights for les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) individuals have clashed with 
regularity in the United States, often resulting in heated litigation.83 Opponents 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id.; Paulson, supra note 1. 
 77 See H.R. Rep. No. 110−406, pt. 1, at 51−54 (2007) (relaying debates in the House which high-
lighted the contention over the proposed religious exemption). 
 78 See id.; Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 4–5. Proponents of the religious exemption 
testified in committee that the broader Title VII exemption provides “greater certainty and is less 
problematic for religious and faith-based employers . . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 110-406, pt. 1, at 51–52 
(internal quotations omitted). Republican members of the house opposed a bona fide occupational 
qualification provision within the religious exemption, arguing that such a provision burdens the hir-
ing prerogatives of religious schools and other religious institutions. Id. at 53–54. 
 79 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007); H. amend. 
882 to H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing that any religious organization exempt under Title 
VII § 702(a) or § 703(e)(2) is also exempt under ENDA of 2007); H. amend. 884 to H.R. 3685, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (striking “gender identity” from bill). 
 80 See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 5. 
 81 See S. Rep. No. 113-105, at 21 (2013) (“This [religious] exemption . . . should ensure that reli-
gious freedom concerns don’t hinder the passage of this critical legislation.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 4. 
 82 See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 61, 122 (2006); Rachel Faithful, Note, Religious Exemption or Exceptionalism? Exploring the 
Tension of First Amendment Religion Protections and Civil Rights Progress Within the Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act, 3 AM. U. LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF 55, 80 (2011). 
 83 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577–78 (2003) (explicitly overruling Bowers v. 
Hartwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding the criminalization of sodomy between consenting 
homosexual adults noting that “condemnation of [sodomy] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic] 
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to homosexual rights most commonly articulate their disapproval in religious 
phraseology, such as the immorality of a homosexual lifestyle or the social evils 
created when family and sexual rights are extended to gay, lesbian, and trans-
gendered citizens.84 The Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas appeared to reject 
the notion that moral perspectives are a compelling state interest in the enact-
ment of legislation that denies certain rights to homosexuals.85 Yet in the con-
text of employment discrimination legislation, the justification for a religious 
exemption is not an argument of morals, but rather one based on the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the right of a religious organization to 
express its views of morality.86 The need to protect the civil rights of gay and 
transgendered persons as well as the constitutional right of religious exercise 
and expression are the main issues that make the religious exemption of the 
2013 Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“2013 ENDA”) so contentious.87 
Any version of an Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) with too nar-
                                                                                                                           
moral and ethical standards”)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (prohibiting states from 
denying equal protection to homosexuals). Compare U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 
(2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of “marriage” as limited to heterosexual 
marriage is unconstitutional), with Cheryl Wetzstein, Proposition 8 Backers Can’t Halt Gay Marriage 
Licenses, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 2013, at A7 (noting that conservative Christian groups were major 
proponents of California’s Proposition 8 effort to stay gay marriages). But see Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing moral disapproval of homosexuality as a source of social harm is a 
justification for denying homosexuals equal protection under state laws). 
 84 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571; Romer, 517 U.S. at 648 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (comparing ho-
mosexuality and polygamy); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195–96 (comparing homosexual conduct to adul-
tery, incest and other sexual crimes); see also Feldblum, supra note 82, at 70 (stating that common 
objections to gay family, sex, and marriage rights are often rooted in the notion that homosexuality is 
naturally sinful and immoral). 
 85 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 578–79 (acknowledging that condemnation of sodomy is based 
in religious and ethical beliefs, but then stating that those beliefs do not provide a “compelling” state 
interest). 
 86 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) 
(holding that Title VII § 702 religious exemption serves a legitimate purpose of “limiting government 
interference with the exercise of religion”); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 83–84 (noting that religious 
employers often argue that they express their beliefs through their business and the character of their 
employees); Wessels, supra note 17, at 1228 (illuminating how religious groups who wish to treat 
homosexual groups disparately from heterosexual counterparts often argue protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause). 
 87 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, Hearing on H.R. 
3017 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 52 (2009) (reporting that religious 
groups testifying that the proposed exemption is necessary in order to maintain the right to express 
their religion); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 115 (arguing that a direct and unconditional regulation of 
religious belief would violate First Amendment jurisprudence but achieving employment equality 
mandate justifies some burden on belief-based hiring practices); Matthew J. Murray, Note, Gay 
Equality, Religious Liberty and the First Amendment, 1 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 125, 191 (2009) (arguing 
that ENDA-like legislation involves a “direct tension” between religious freedom and the employment 
equality it intends to achieve). 
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row an exemption would violate free expression, while an exemption fashioned 
too broadly may undermine the very purpose of the ENDA.88 
A. An Analysis of Title VII’s Religious Exemption 
Federal courts have been generous in determining which types of organi-
zations qualify for Title VII religious exemptions.89 For example, a religious 
hospital is exempt from Title VII’s ban on discriminatory practices based on 
religious preferences even if the hospital is engaged in secular healthcare prac-
tices and routinely hires employees of other religions.90 In Hall v. Baptist Me-
morial Health Care Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
found that a nursing school with religious affiliations fell under the Title VII 
exemption and was free to accept or reject students on the basis of religion.91 
The court held that the nursing school was exempt from the Title VII discrimi-
nation protections despite the fact that the school trained students to enter a 
secular professional field.92 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that because the 
school’s atmosphere was peppered with religious ideals, hosted Baptist pro-
grams and services, and held itself out publically as a religious institution, the 
college was exempt from Title VII’s religious discrimination prohibition.93 
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to nar-
row the framework under which non-profit organizations might qualify as reli-
giously exempt under Title VII.94 In Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., World Vi-
sion, a non-profit organization, had no official affiliation with any particular 
religious denomination but self-identified as a broad Christian organization 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, Hearing on H.R. 3017 Before the H. Comm. 
on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 52; Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121. 
 89 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that exempting a non-profit 
organization leaves open the question as to whether a for-profit organization could qualify as a reli-
gious organization under Title VII); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 741 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that a non-profit organization unaffiliated with any particular Christian denomination is ex-
empt because of its close ties to religious tenants and purpose); E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, 
Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (finding a Presbyterian retirement home exempt); 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (finding that the Salvation 
Army qualified as an exempt religious organization). 
 90 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(1)(a) (2012); Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs.-Iowa Corp., 456 F. 
Supp. 2d 1021, 1044 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (finding a Catholic hospital exempt despite the fact that it 
hired non-Catholic employee and had non-Catholics on its board of directors). 
 91 See Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 625. 
 94 See Spencer, 633 F.3d at 734 (imposing a three-part assessment to determine whether an organ-
ization was founded with religious ideals and therefore qualifies for a religious exemption under Title 
VII). 
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and carried out its activities under an umbrella of Christian values.95 The or-
ganization provided services to needy children within the spirit of its Christian 
principles.96 Though World Vision was not itself a church or religious school, 
the organization did incorporate religious symbols and rhetoric into its market-
ing instruments, and it self-identified as a religious group.97 The two plaintiffs 
in Spencer each worked for World Vision for ten years and primarily provided 
maintenance services for the corporation’s office facilities.98 World Vision ter-
minated the plaintiffs upon learning that the plaintiffs did not believe in the 
Christian Trinity.99 The plaintiffs brought action under Title VII and World Vi-
sion defended the discrimination claim by asserting status as an exempt reli-
gious organization.100 
In determining the merits of World Vision’s argument, the Ninth Circuit 
established a three-part test to assess exemption status under Title VII.101 The 
first part of the test probes a non-profit’s religious purpose as identified by its 
incorporating or foundational documents; the second asks whether there is a 
close nexus between the organization’s activity and its self-stated religious 
purpose; and, finally, the third part requires that the organization “holds itself 
out to the public as religious.”102 The Ninth Circuit found that World Vision 
satisfied all three parts and therefore qualified as an exempt institution.103 
Despite the Spencer court’s attempt to clarify the application of Title VII’s 
religious exemption, Circuit Judge Berzon, in her dissent, criticized the majori-
ty’s three-part analysis as far too broad.104 Judge Berzon noted that nearly any 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See id. at 735–38. World Vision’s Articles of Incorporation stated that its primary business was 
“to conduct Christian religious missionary services . . . .” Id. at 736 (internal quotations omitted). 
 96 See id. The court noted that World Vision’s activity was simply providing aid to needy individ-
uals—activity that would be secular aid but for World Vision’s mission statement. Id. 
 97 See id. at 738. The court found that World Vision “ma[de] no effort to disguise its Christian 
nature,” though the court admitted the analysis was muddied by the fact that the organization did not 
have formal ties to a particular sect or church. See id. at 738, 740. 
 98 See id. at 725. 
 99 See id. The Trinity Doctrine “describes God the Father, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit as 
three persons but one being.” Id. at 725 n.1. World Vision discovered that the plaintiffs disavowed 
Christ and for that reason alone discharged the employees. Id. at 725. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 734; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(1)(a) (2012). 
 102 See Spencer, 633 F.3d at 734. 
 103 See id. at 748. The court noted that World Vision was founded as a Christian humanitarian 
organization, motivated by teachings of Jesus Christ. Id. at 739. The Ninth Circuit also found that 
World Vision’s charitable activities, though highly secular in function, were connected to a religious 
purpose because the organization solicited donations via a website that portrayed Christian teachings 
and ideals. See id. at 740. Finally, the circuit court held that World Vision self-identified as a Christian 
organization despite not having a formal affiliation with any church. See id. 
 104 Id. at 749 (Berzon, J., dissenting). “This test would allow a broad range of organizations to 
refuse to hire and to fire any employee on the basis of religious belief, including organizations that 
lack any ties to organized religion and perform daily operations entirely secular in nature.” Id. 
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organization engaged in secular humanitarian efforts could hold itself under a 
religiously inspired umbrella.105 Allowing these organizations to self-define the 
scope and nature of their activities would permit many loosely religious organ-
izations to engage in secular activities, yet retain the ability to discriminate 
based upon religion, even if their employees perform entirely secular func-
tions.106 
B. The 2013 ENDA’s Application of Title VII’s Exemption and Its  
Impact on the LGBT Workforce 
The 2013 ENDA’s direct usage of Title VII’s religious discrimination ex-
emption would have permitted an array of religious organizations and affiliates 
to actively discriminate against LGBT employees even if the organizations 
operate in a primarily secular field.107 Religious institutions account for a sig-
nificant portion of public service institutions; for example, religious hospitals 
constitute thirteen percent of the nation’s community-based hospitals.108 It 
would therefore be generally permissible under the 2013 ENDA for thirteen 
percent of U.S. hospitals to discriminate against the hiring of LGBT doctors, 
nurses, social workers, and general maintenance staff.109 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. at 748 n.1, 752. Judge Berzon commented on the Title VII exemption: 
I refer to [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e-1(a) as the ‘religious organization exemption.’ It is the 
broadest of several Title VII provisions . . . that carve out religious entities for special 
treatment. Only § 2000e-1(a) permits religious organizations to hire and fire on the ba-
sis of religion without regard to the employee’s function within the organization. 
Id. at 748 n.1. Under the 2013 ENDA, religious organizations would similarly have been able to re-
fuse to hire and fire employees on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity as the act uses 
the Title VII framework for exemptions. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 
113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013) (as passed by the Senate on November 7, 2013). 
 107 See Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean to Have a “First Amendment” for Sexual 
Orientation?, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 
234, 236 (Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998) (arguing that parts of the private em-
ployment market are “public” for antidiscrimination purposes and a religious institution engaged in 
secular activity should not able to offer religious rationales to discriminatory employment practices); 
Feldblum, supra note 82, at 115 (“If the ‘justifying principle’ of the legislation is to protect the liberty 
of LGBT people to live freely and safely in all parts of society, it is perfectly reasonable for a legisla-
ture not to provide any exemption that will cordon off a significant segment of society . . . .”); Murray, 
supra note 87, at 160–61 (arguing that non-discrimination laws do not violate first amendment rights 
of institutions who maintain secular relationships with employees and, conversely, the harm imposed 
on LGBT population by allowing such discrimination is a secular harm). 
 108 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121; Debra B. Stulberg et al., Religious Hospitals and Prima-
ry Care Physicians: Conflicts over Policies for Patient Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 725, 725 
(2010). 
 109 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012); Hall, 215 F.3d at 625 (stating that a religiously affiliated 
nursing home qualifies for a religious exemption under Title VII); S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013); 
110 CONG. REC. 6, 7217 (1964) (“[A] hospital which is owned and operated by a religious order 
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Religious organizations also operate a significant number of elementary 
and secondary educational institutions in the United States.110 Private schools 
consist of approximately 24% of all elementary and secondary schools and 
also employ about 12% of all full-time teachers.111 76% of these private 
schools are religiously affiliated institutions.112 Additionally, religious organi-
zations provide approximately half of the nation’s adoption services.113 Some 
legal scholars object to a wide religious institution exemption, arguing that 
non-discrimination laws should apply generally to any religiously affiliated 
organization that enters the secular stream of commerce by operating hospitals, 
retirement homes, large-scale adoption agencies, large schools or universities, 
and other public accommodations.114 
It is clear that many religious groups have a legitimate interest in a minis-
terial or curriculum exemption because the First Amendment protects religious 
expression, which includes an interest in maintaining discretion in the em-
ployment of faith-expressive employees.115 While this interest furthers a com-
pelling argument to protect the First Amendment rights of religious groups when 
selecting their leadership, doctrinal teachers, and other belief-oriented personnel, 
it fails to proffer a reasoned basis for discrimination as to secular-in-function 
employees, especially for organizations operating in the public market.116 
                                                                                                                           
would be exempt . . . .”); Murray, supra note 87, at 226 (illustrating inconsistency in application of 
non-discrimination laws by comparing an impermissible situation where a religious hospital only hires 
male doctors against the permissible situation of only hiring heterosexual doctors). 
 110 See U.S. DEP’T EDUC., NCES 2008-315, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2005–2006 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 1 (2008). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 David Brodzinsky, Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men, in ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY 
MEN: A NEW DIMENSION IN FAMILY DIVERSITY 62, 69 (David M. Brodzinsky & Adam Pertman, 
eds., 2012). Notably, the author’s survey demonstrated that 17% of U.S. adoption agencies were affil-
iated with Catholicism, 5% were affiliated with Lutheranism, and 4% were affiliated with Judaism. Id. 
 114 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121. 
 115 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012); Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 708 (2012) (holding that the ag-
grieved employee was a minister and that Title VII protects the interests of a religious employer to 
choose who may preach their beliefs); S. 815 § 6(a) (2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 
2013, Hearing on S. 815 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong., at 
21 (2013) (reporting that the religious exemption garnered support for the ENDA from religious lead-
ers). The ministerial exemption permits an institution to hire employees discriminately in certain posi-
tions of leadership and transmission of religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
 116 See U.S. CONST. amend 1; Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 4 (“Without strong ex-
emptions, religious organizations will be required, as a condition of seeking workers to carry out their 
faith-based missions, to affirm conduct that is in diametric opposition to the moral principles of their 
faith.”); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (stating that there is no reason to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation where the employee’s position is unconnected to religious expression or indoctrina-
tion); Wessels, supra note 17, at 1222 (arguing there is a genuine distinction between organizations 
that are pervasively religious and those that offer general free-market services). 
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Private religious schools are a brief example of one danger of failing to 
distinguish between religious-in-expression and secular-in-function type or-
ganizations.117 Some scholars have noted that parochial schools, particularly in 
urban areas, are in reality a “free-market” alternative to public schools.118 The 
Eastside Catholic High School near Seattle is one such example, where the 
vast majority of the school’s curriculum is secular and the school is open to 
students of all creeds and backgrounds.119 Although these schools do partici-
pate in expressive activity by requiring theology and religion classes, they are 
equally involved in the secular education arena, offering students advanced 
education in math, sciences, and English.120 
The blending of religious and secular commercial activities that occur in 
the context of private religious schools, as well as in the context of other reli-
giously affiliated organizations, demonstrates the tension not addressed by the 
broad exemption furthered by the 2013 ENDA.121 The vast religious institution 
exemption does not protect LGBT employees charged with wholly secular 
tasks who work for an employer that operates in the secular market place but 
self-identifies as religious.122 Some scholars argue that when the employer is 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Wessels, supra note 17, at 1222; Paulson, supra, note 1. 
 118 See Wessels, supra note 17, at 1222. Wessels demonstrates that in urban areas the commercial 
reality of a private religious school is to: 
offer a lower student-to-teacher ratio, more one-on-one instruction, specialized instruc-
tion, a safer environment, and other attractive characteristics. Even though a school may 
have a religious study requirement and the Ten Commandments on the wall, it might 
not require its students, teachers, or other personnel to adhere to its faith or to abide by 
its doctrine. In other words, though nominally parochial, they are practically secular. 
Id. at 1223. 
 119 See Kuruvilla, supra note 1; Paulson, supra note 1 (citing that many students and teachers are 
not Catholic and that some students are attracted to the school for its educational quality). 
 120 See, e.g., Gay Rights Coal. v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 567, 574 n.12 (D.C. 1985), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part on reh’g, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (applying D.C. code protecting 
against disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation and holding that Georgetown University 
could provide equal protection to homosexual students without abandoning its religious objectives); 
Wessels, supra note 17, at 1222−23, 1228 (comparing Gay Rights Coal. to employment discrimina-
tion issues arising in parochial schools); Kuruvilla, supra note 1; Paulson, supra note 1 (noting that 
many students and teachers are not Catholic and that some students are attracted to the school for its 
educational quality). 
 121 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (arguing that many religious institutions should have 
freedom to hire and fire at a directorial level that actually involves religious expression but not at a 
level where the employees’ function remotely affects expressive interests); Wessels, supra note 17, at 
1223 (arguing that these types of institutions have both religious and secular purposes, which under-
mines a broad application of religious exemptions). 
 122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th 
Cong. § 6(a) (2013) (as passed by the Senate on November 7, 2013); see Murray, supra note 87, at 
171 (stating that objectors often assert that their religious beliefs condemn homosexuality and there-
fore requiring them to hire homosexuals infringes their religious beliefs). 
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not engaged in any inherently religiously expressive business, the employer 
has no right to control the private conduct of employees.123 Accordingly, an 
employer may retain the right to religious beliefs and the right to believe that 
homosexuality and certain gender identities are immoral, but must nevertheless 
accommodate LGBT employees, as any employer in the public sphere would 
be required to do.124 
C. Freedom of Religious Expression: Analysis of Justifications for a 
Religious Exemption from the ENDA 
The freedom to exercise and express religious beliefs has been a corner-
stone of American liberty for over two centuries.125 This principle underlies 
Title VII’s religious exemptions.126 Congress intended to protect the right of 
certain institutions to propagate their faith and religious beliefs by providing 
these institutions discretion in their hiring practices.127 Title VII provides for 
three exemptions to the ban on religious employment discrimination: a bona 
fide occupational qualification, often referred to as the “ministerial exemp-
tion,” a curriculum exemption, and the “religious organization” exemption, the 
broadest exemption of the three.128 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See McConnell, supra note 107, at 254 (“One does not have to think homosexuality is moral 
to believe that employers have no business interfering in the private lives of their employees.”); Feld-
blum, supra note 82, at 102–03; Murray, supra note 87, at 171. 
 124 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 102–03 (stating that “belief liberty” is the right to hold reli-
gious beliefs and regulating certain conduct does not necessarily infringe on belief liberty). 
 125 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Amos, 483 U.S. at 334, 338 (holding a church exempt from Title 
VII and permitting it, as a free exercise right, to fire janitor who could not prove membership to the 
Mormon Church); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (holding that an Amish family has 
an exemption from the state’s mandatory education law under free exercise clause); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L 
REV. 1409, 1421 (1990) (stating that the United States was founded to safeguard against government 
oppression of religion). 
 126 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) 
(2012); see Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (noting that Congress acted with the rational purpose to allow reli-
gious groups to carry out their beliefs in fashioning the Title VII religious exemption). 
 127 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 714 (holding that a church must be 
free to choose its religious leadership without burden under the First Amendment); see Amos, 483 
U.S. at 338 (stating that Congress intended to exempt all actions of religious organizations in within 
the Title VII exemption). 
 128 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (offering an exemption to religious corporations, associations, and 
organizations); id. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (addressing the bona fide occupational exemption by stating that it 
is not an unlawful employment practice to hire “on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in 
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); id. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (addressing the curriculum exemption by stating that “it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for a[n] educational institution . . . to hire and employ employees of a 
particular religion . . . if the curriculum of such . . . educational institution . . . is directed toward the 
propagation of a particular religion.”) (emphasis added); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 13 (discussing 
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The ministerial exemption permits an institution to discriminately hire 
employees in certain positions of leadership and who are responsible for the 
transmission of religious beliefs.129 This exemption, however, imposes a bona 
fide occupational qualification where the religious employer must show that 
the subject employee was charged primarily with duties of carrying out and 
expressing a church’s religious beliefs.130 
Similar to the ministerial exemption, the curriculum exemption applies to 
religious schools and educational institutions hiring teachers or supervisors 
charged with indoctrinating, teaching, and guiding others in the practice of a 
particular faith.131 In 1993, the Ninth Circuit addressed the curriculum exemp-
tion in E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Schools, holding that the exemption was lim-
ited to a school whose curriculum “reflects an effort to spread and inculcate 
particular religious beliefs” and does not include a general educational curricu-
lum in which faith is merely an underlying tenet.132 
The third category of exemptions has been interpreted to apply broadly to 
a host of organizations without regard for the qualifications or functions of the 
particular employees.133 The 2013 ENDA religious exemption provided that its 
prohibitions would not apply to entities exempt from the religious discrimina-
tion provisions of Title VII.134 The 2013 ENDA explicitly adopted the religious 
exemption found in section 702(a) of Title VII, which reads: 
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the 
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corpora-
tion, association, educational institution, or society with respect to 
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
                                                                                                                           
the presence of a ministerial exemption in Title VII which is based off of the First Amendment, pro-
hibiting the application of employment laws to a “religious institution and its ministers”). 
 129 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 17–18 (holding that the aggrieved 
employee was a minister and that Title VII protects the interests of a religious employer to choose 
who may preach their beliefs). 
 130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 17–18. 
 131 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2); see E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Sch., 990 F.3d 458, 464–65 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
 132 See Kamehameha, 990 F.3d at 464–65 (holding that Kamehameha Schools were not within 
“curriculum exemption” because school curriculum merely advanced general moral values and did not 
concern converting students to Protestantism or inoculating students with Protestant beliefs). 
 133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); see Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (stating that the intention of Congress in 
Title VII’s religious exemption clause was to cover all religious activities and employers). 
 134 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013) (“This act 
shall not apply to a corporation, association, educational institution or institution of learning, or socie-
ty that is exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of title VII . . . (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a)) 
. . . .”); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
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work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, associa-
tion, educational institution, or society of its activities.135 
When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, the Act’s religious exemption origi-
nally read, “to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corpora-
tion, association, or society of its religious activities.”136 Title VII exempted an 
organization only to the extent that the organization was engaged in activities 
that were religious in nature.137 
In 1972, Congress amended this section to remove the word “religious” 
before “activities,” thereby eliminating the qualification that a religious institu-
tion be actively engaged in “religious activities” to benefit from the exemp-
tion.138 The amendment made clear that the exemption would focus on the af-
filiation of the employing institution rather than the nature of the employer’s 
business activities.139 In essence, the exemption as currently construed permits 
a broad range of religious organizations to discriminate in their employment 
practices even if the organizations and their employees are engaged in tradi-
tionally secular activities such as operating hospitals or running professional 
trade schools.140 The expansion of Title VII’s religious exemption was a delib-
erate act by Congress.141 In fact, Senator Samuel Ervin, a co-sponsor of the 
1972 amendment, stated in a prior session of Congress that, “[a]s a matter of 
policy, I think people who establish a religious institution and people who es-
tablish a church should be allowed to select a janitor or a secretary who is a 
member of the church in preference to someone who is an infidel or nonmem-
ber.”142 Under the 2013 ENDA, the same policy articulated by Senator Ervin 
                                                                                                                           
 135 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013). 
 136 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
 139 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (focusing on the religious affiliation of the 
employer and not on the function of the employee’s work activities). 
 140 See Hall, 215 F.3d at 624–25; Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1027, 1044 (holding a Catho-
lic hospital qualified for an exemption under the terms of Title VII despite hiring non-Catholic em-
ployees and having non-Catholics on its board of directors); 110 CONG. REC. 6, 7217 (1964) (Sen. 
Clark stating that “a hospital which is owned and operated by a religious order would be exempt”); 
Kaliko Warrington, Preserving Religious Freedom and Autonomy of Religious Institutions After Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 
203, 207 (2003); see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 346 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating concern that the 
exemption will continue to grow to encompass organizations which have speculative religious under-
pinnings). 
 141 See Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (enacted) (succeeding in amending the reli-
gious exemption of Title VII); S. 2453, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. 34,565 (1970) (unenacted) (at-
tempting to expand the scope of Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations). 
 142 See S. 2453, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. 34,565, at 1977 (1970) (unenacted). 
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would operate against gay, lesbian, and transgender employees despite work-
ing or attempting to work in a non-religious capacity.143 
III. NARROWING THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION IN THE ENDA: A SECULAR-
IN-FUNCTION APPROACH TO LIMITING EMPLOYMENT  
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT EMPLOYEES 
Although the House discontinued its consideration of any version of the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) for this current term, the issues 
posed by a broad religious exemption nonetheless provide a critical discussion 
for future constructions of the act.144 There is a need to pass federal non-
discrimination legislation given the frightful statistics of employment discrim-
ination against workers that are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered 
(LGBT).145 Furthermore, Congress must understand that a religious exemption 
that appeals to the expansive Title VII exemption would contradict the very 
purpose of the ENDA.146 
Some states have attempted to address these concerns in their statewide 
prohibitions of employment discrimination based upon sexual orientation and 
sexual identity by implementing bona fide occupational qualification require-
ments or a categorical exclusion for religious corporations operating in fields 
such as health care.147 While some of these approaches provide guidance, the 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013) (as 
passed by Senate November 7, 2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755 113th 
Cong. (2013) (referred to committee); S. 2453, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. 34,565 (1970) (unenact-
ed); Murray, supra note 87, at 200 (pointing out that the current exemption can be extended to “secre-
taries, janitors, . . . accountants,” and similar positions). 
 144 See S. 815 § 6(a); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755 (referred to com-
mittee); S. 2453, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. 34,565 (1970) (enacted); see also Sarah M. Stephens, 
What Happens Next? Will Protection Against Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Workplace 
Discrimination Expand During President Obama’s Second Term? 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 365, 384 (2013). 
 145 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, Hearing on S. 815 Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong., at 15 (2013) (citing a 2011 survey illustrating that 
ninety percent of transgendered employees in the United States experienced some form of harassment 
or discrimination in the workplace); Grant, supra note 5, at 51; Sears & Mallory, supra note 5, at 1 
(citing that twenty-seven percent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees believed that they had been 
discriminated against or harassed due to their sexual orientation). 
 146 Compare S. 815 § 2 (stating that the purpose of the Act is to address the pattern of discrimina-
tion against LGBT employees and provide explicit federal protections from such discrimination to 
LGBT employees), with Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (arguing that if the purpose of the ENDA is 
in fact to protect LGBT employment interests, then the ENDA must protect LGBT employees against 
those employers who will proffer religious reasons for continuing discriminatory practices). 
 147 See, e.g., Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.2 (West 2011); 
Employment Nondiscrimination Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2009); D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
151B, § 4 (2013). 
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approaches vary by state and judicial interpretation varies by jurisdiction.148 
Some scholarly proposals offer a religious exemption solution to the ENDA 
question such as imposing an examination of the religious affiliate’s expressive 
function.149 Ultimately, however, a categorical exception for religious affiliates 
operating in a secular market would best balance the rights of LGBT employ-
ees to be free from prejudicial employment practices in a secular field while 
simultaneously protecting a religious organization’s right to legitimate belief 
expression.150 
A. State-by-State Approach to Religious Exemptions for Employment  
Non-Discrimination Statutes 
Currently, sixteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimina-
tory employment practices on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identi-
ty in both private and public employment.151 Although the exemption mecha-
nisms for these statutes greatly differ from state to state, the various state ex-
emptions provide some guidance on how to best tailor a religious organization 
exemption to the ENDA, so as to not license discrimination against the LGBT 
workforce under the veil of religious affiliation.152 
It is important to note that some states provide simply for a broad reli-
gious association exemption similar to the exemption for religious discrimina-
tion in section 702 of Title VII and, consequently, similar to section 6 of the 
2013 version of the ENDA (“2013 ENDA”).153 For example, the District of 
Columbia provides for a religious exemption that encompasses nearly any reli-
                                                                                                                           
 148 Compare Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act § 12926.2 (exempting religious organizations 
but excluding religious institutions that operate health care facilities), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
151B, § 4(18) (exempting religious associations so long as the discriminatory hiring practice is calcu-
lated to further the religious purpose of the organization). 
 149 See Murray, supra note 87, at 220–21; Kate B. Rhodes, Note, Defending ENDA: The Ramifi-
cations of Omitting the BFOQ Defense in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 19 L. & SEXUAL-
ITY REV. LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 1, 13–14 (2010). 
 150 See McConnell, supra note 107, at 254 (arguing that religious organizations who offer general 
public services should have more control over the private conduct of their employees than non-
religious employers in the same market); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121–22. 
 151 Grant, supra note 5, at 3–4 (citing the full list of the sixteen states that provide employment 
protections for all LGBT employees in both private and public sectors); see, e.g., Cal. Gender Non-
Discrimination Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2011); Employment Nondiscrimination Act, 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-81c; D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11; HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (LexisNexis 201); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2006); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 151B, § 4. 
 152 See Murray, supra note 87, at 233; see, e.g., Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act, CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 12940; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(18). 
 153 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th 
Cong. § 6(a) (2013) (as passed by Senate November 7, 2013); see, e.g., Employment Nondiscrimina-
tion Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(3) (2014); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.03 (LexisNexis 2012). 
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giously founded organization so long as the organization’s activities are rea-
sonably calculated to promote its religious beliefs.154 Colorado additionally 
exempts any non-profit religious organization or association.155 The statutes 
establishing such policies do not provide much guidance in reformulating the 
ENDA religious exemption simply because the exemptions are nearly identical 
to what the 2013 ENDA proposed.156 
Other states, however, have attempted to narrow the religious exemption 
significantly.157 Massachusetts, for example, exempts an organization con-
trolled or operated by a religious institution in so far as the employer’s hiring 
and firing practices, disciplinary methods, or training mechanisms are calculat-
ed to promote religious principles.158 The Massachusetts statutory exemption 
requires the organization claiming the exemption to demonstrate that the prej-
udicial employment practice relates directly to a religious function.159 Interest-
ingly, Connecticut does not explicitly provide for a religious employer exemp-
                                                                                                                           
 154 D.C. CODE § 2-1401.03. The law provides for an exemption relating to the chapter’s prohibi-
tion on employment discrimination: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to bar any religious or political organization, 
or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, 
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious or political organization, 
from limiting employment, or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same 
religion or political persuasion as is calculated by the organization to promote the reli-
gious or political principles for which it is established or maintained. 
§ 2-1401.03(b). 
 155 Employment Nondiscrimination Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(3) (2014). Under the 
Colorado statute, the term “employer” does not include “religious organizations or associations, ex-
cept such organizations or associations supported in whole or in part by money raised by taxation or 
public borrowing.” Id. 
 156 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (exempting religious corporations, organizations, and 
schools broadly), and S. 815 § 6(a), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(3) (exempting “religious 
organizations or associations”), and D.C. CODE § 2-1401.03 (exempting religious organizations and 
associations). 
 157 See, e.g., Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.2 (West 2011); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(18) (2013). 
 158 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(18). The law states, 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special law nothing herein shall be 
construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any or-
ganization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, super-
vised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, from limiting ad-
mission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from 
taking any action with respect to matters of employment, discipline, faith, internal or-
ganization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law which are calculated by such organiza-
tion to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained. 
Id. 
 159 Id. 
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tion at all in its prohibition of employment discrimination.160 Rather, Connecti-
cut simply exempts preferential employment practices on the basis of a bona 
fide occupational qualification.161 
Finally, California began a noteworthy initiative to exclude religiously af-
filiated health care employers from its religious exemption to discriminatory 
employment practices.162 Under the California statute, a religious employer 
operating a health care facility cannot discriminate on the basis of sexual ori-
entation and gender identity so long as the particular function of the employee 
is unrelated to doctrinal or pastoral duties.163 The California law confronts reli-
gious affiliates operating in secular health care, a market in which religious 
organizations are heavily involved nationwide.164 A similar provision in the 
next version of the ENDA could afford federal protections to LGBT employees 
who wish to enter such secular markets where religious affiliates constitute a 
significant portion of employers.165 This narrow exclusion for health care pro-
viders, however, would have to be extended to prohibit discrimination carried 
out by other religious organizations offering secular public services, such as 
secondary and postsecondary education, humanitarian services, and adoption 
services.166 
                                                                                                                           
 160 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a) (West 2009). 
 161 Id. A bona fide occupational qualification analyzes whether the particular job requires certain 
qualifications that incidentally excludes a protected class under the antidiscrimination statutes. See 
Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 944 A.2d 925, 936 (Conn. 2008) (stating that a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification defense is the relevant portion that provides an exemption from the non-
discrimination statute). 
 162 Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.2(c); see Murray, supra 
note 87, at 233. 
 163 Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act § 12926.2(c). Despite exempting religious organizations 
from the definition of employer under the anti-discrimination statute, the law states that 
“[E]mployer” includes a religious corporation with respect to persons employed by the 
religious association or corporation to perform duties, other than religious duties, at a 
health care facility operated by the religious association or corporation for the provision 
of health care that is not restricted to adherents of the religion that established the asso-
ciation or corporation. 
Id. 
 164 See id.; Stulberg, supra note 108, at 725 (noting that religiously affiliated hospitals constitute a 
significant percentage of nationwide hospital service providers). 
 165 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122; Murray, supra note 87, at 226. 
 166 See Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act § 12926.2(c) (excluding only health care providing 
organizations from the religious exemption); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121–22 (noting that a nar-
rower exemption is necessary to prohibit discriminatory practices of organizations that enter the pub-
lic market and provide general services); Murray, supra note 87, at 226 (arguing that employees for a 
religiously affiliated hospital or drug rehabilitation center do not engage in belief expression and 
therefore said employees should be protected under antidiscrimination laws). 
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B. Proposed Solutions to the Over-Inclusive Religious Exemption 
Scholars have offered proposals to narrow the scope of the 2013 ENDA’s 
religious exemption and reconcile the disparate exemption methods proffered 
by the states.167 One such option would be a narrow bona fide occupational 
qualification test that applies separately from the ministerial exemption pro-
vided for in section 703 of Title VII.168 This bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion approach appears to be popular among many states that have implemented 
sexual orientation and gender identity protections, including Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and California.169 
With a bona fide occupational qualification requirement, an amended 
ENDA statute would require religious organizations to assess whether a partic-
ular employee’s position and function necessitates adherence to religious ten-
ets, specifically whether the position requires the employee to be heterosexu-
al.170 In states with sexual orientation and gender identity protections, federal 
courts that have upheld bona fide occupational requirements have interpreted 
the requirement using a two-part test: (1) whether the job requires the worker 
to be of a particular sexual orientation or gender identity, and, if so, (2) wheth-
er the requirement bears a reasonably necessary relationship to the employer’s 
business.171 This test would alleviate discrimination against the LGBT work-
force employed or applying for employment in a secular capacity.172 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122; Murray, supra note 87, at 220–21; Rhodes, supra note 
148, at 13–14. 
 168 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (providing a bona fide occupational qualification as 
related to ‘sex’); Rhodes, supra note 148, at 13–14 (arguing that a bona fide occupational qualification 
test should be more of an assessment of whether an organization adheres to the principles of its identi-
fied faith). 
 169 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act § 12926.2(c); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(18) (2013) (permitting 
disparate hiring practices when the employer’s activity and employee’s function relate to carrying out 
religious activities); Murray; supra note 87, at 173 n.149 (citing that some states exempt services 
performed specifically in connection with religious activities). 
 170 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a); Rhodes, supra note 148, at 18–19. 
 171 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (providing a bona fide occupational qualification as related to 
‘sex’); see Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that airline 
could not demonstrate that marital status of its female stewardesses had any relation to the bona fide 
qualifications of an airline stewardess); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th 
Cir. 1971) (holding that an airline cannot exclude all males from becoming flight attendants because 
there is no reasonable relation between sex and the qualifications of a flight attendant); Wilson v. Sw. 
Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 304–05 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that airline could not establish that its 
policy of hiring only female flight attendants was exempt under a bona fide occupational qualification 
defense because sex characteristics were not reasonably related to the duties of a flight attendant); 
Rhodes, supra note 148, at 19. 
 172 Rhodes, supra note 148, at 13–14 (arguing that a bona fide occupational qualification would 
help protect LGBT interests against those employers claiming religious reasons for discrimination); 
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A glaring issue with the two-part test, however, is that the test would re-
quire a neutral court to adequately judge a religious employer’s beliefs and 
how closely those beliefs relate to a particular mission.173 Not only is this a 
difficult test for courts to administer as it necessitates a searching analysis of a 
particular employee’s function, but the test also presents an issue for religious 
organizations that would be required to delineate detailed qualifications for 
employment positions.174 The Supreme Court in Presiding Bishop v. Amos dis-
cussed this fear that the imposition of liability to certain employment circum-
stances but not others would create uncertainty and deter organizations from 
carrying out their religious missions.175 
An alternate approach would be to focus on the employer-employee rela-
tionship.176 This exemption would analyze whether the employer- employee 
relationship is secular in nature or expressive of religious tenets—the former 
being subject to the ENDA’s antidiscrimination protections, while the latter 
relationship would be exempt.177 Essentially, an employee who is directly 
charged with carrying out and expressing the religious views of the employing 
organization would have an expressive relationship with the employer.178 The 
employer would be exempt from the ENDA antidiscrimination provisions be-
                                                                                                                           
see Murray, supra note 87, at 233 n.330 (citing that some states adopt a bona fide occupational quali-
fication exemption to protect LGBT employees who perform secular functions). 
 173 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (stating that it would be a 
burden on free exercise of religion if religious organizations were required to examine the nature of its 
activities in relation to its beliefs); Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 5–6 (arguing that it is 
burdensome on both religious organizations and courts to require they examine the precise relation-
ship between a belief and the particular activity performed). 
 174 See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 5–6 (“Given how important the moral issues 
implicated in sexual conduct are regarded to be by many religious communities and their religious 
organizations, this categorical ENDA exemption is an important confirmation of religious freedom.”). 
 175 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336; Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 5–6. In Amos the Su-
preme Court explained: 
[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substan-
tial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The 
line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that 
a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission. Fear of potential 
liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its re-
ligious mission. 
483 U.S. at 336. 
 176 Murray, supra note 87, at 220–21; see McConnell, supra note 107, at 254. 
 177 See Murray, supra note 87, at 225–26. “Expressive” means that the employee is charged with 
carrying out the teachings and beliefs of the religion as opposed to carrying out a broadly humanitari-
an activity with religious justifications. Id. 
 178 Id. at 226; see Feldblum, supra note 82, at 103 (“[C]ourts have recognized that certain [em-
ployee] conduct may be used to communicate an expressive belief.”). 
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cause the employer is expressing religious beliefs directly through the employ-
ee and the employee’s duties.179 
In contrast, an employee who does nothing more than provide a secular 
service for the employer would not be engaged in expressive activity and in 
such circumstances, the employer would not be free to discriminate.180 The 
relevant considerations would focus on the mission and business of the em-
ployer, the employee’s particular function, and the nexus between employee 
activity and religious expression.181 Nevertheless, this relational approach 
would be difficult to administer, as a secular court would face the difficulty of 
judging the precise relationship between the employer and employee, as well 
as the difficulty of evaluating the genuine relationship between certain activi-
ties and religious beliefs.182 
C. A Categorical Exclusion for Religious-in-Name but  
Secular-in-Function Organizations 
A final remedy for the 2013 ENDA’s inability to fully protect LGBT em-
ployment rights would be to apply a categorical exclusion to the 2013 ENDA 
exception.183 The categorical exclusion would maintain all three Title VII ex-
emptions, yet within the broad religious institution exemption, it would carve 
out certain identifiable classes of institutions that would remain liable.184 Insti-
tutions that should be subject to the ENDA’s prohibition of discriminatory 
practices are those organizations that, despite a religious affiliation, are open to 
the public at large and offer a variety of non-religious and general services.185 
Under this construction of the exemption, religiously affiliated hospitals, adop-
tion agencies, treatment centers, and welfare service providers would be pro-
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121–22 (noting that religious leadership roles should be ex-
empt because religious organizations ought to have discretion in hiring its leaders); Murray, supra 
note 87, at 225–26. 
 180 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (stating that an employee with a wholly non-religious 
function should be afforded protection); Murray, supra note 87, at 225–26. 
 181 Murray, supra note 87, at 226; see McConnell, supra note 107, at 256. 
 182 See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 20, at 5 (arguing that requiring a secular court to judge 
the value of certain religious activities poses undue restrictions on the rights of religious groups); 
Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (implying that a categorical exclusion for organizations operating in 
the public market would be a bright-line rule that is simple to administer). 
 183 Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122. 
 184 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th 
Cong. § 6(a) (2013) (as passed by Senate November 7, 2013); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (pro-
posing that when religious institutions enter the public marketplace and offer general public services 
they should be required to provide such services without discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity). 
 185 Feldblum, supra note 82, at, 121–22; see McConnell, supra note 107, at 256 (implying that 
there should be a narrowed exemption which addresses religious employers who enter the public mar-
ket of non-religious services). 
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hibited from discriminating against LGBT persons applying for positions in 
which the individual’s sexual orientation bears no relation to the performance 
of generally secular duties.186 
A categorical approach would be similar to California’s exclusion of reli-
gious health care institutions from exemption status, but would broaden the ex-
clusion to other secular-in-function organizations; including religious-affiliate 
universities and secondary schools that are open to non-members and instruct 
secular curricula.187 The test would be easily administered because the focus of 
the analysis is simply whether the organizations operate within the “public” 
realm and offer public services.188 Organizations operating in these public 
spheres are often readily identifiable, namely those organizations that princi-
pally offer general healthcare, educational, or humanitarian services to the 
community as a whole.189 Therefore, a categorical standard would not require 
the courts to delve into an analysis of the particular belief-activity relationship 
but rather simply identify the market in which the organization typically oper-
ates.190 This would prevent a religious hospital from denying employment to a 
gay doctor based on his sexual orientation, and also prevent a religious univer-
sity from discriminatorily firing a transgendered janitor.191 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121–22. Professor Feldblum writes: 
Many religious institutions operate the gamut of social services in the community, such 
as hospitals, gyms, adoption agencies and drug treatment centers. These enterprises are 
open and marketed to the general public and often receive governmental funds. It seems 
quite appropriate to require that the enterprises’ services be delivered without regard to 
sexual orientation and that most employment positions in these enterprises be available 
without regard to sexual orientation. 
Id. at 122. 
 187 See Cal. Gender Non-Discrimination Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.2(c) (West 2011); Feld-
blum, supra note 82, at 121–22; Wessels, supra note 17, at 1222 (illustrating that many urban-area 
parochial schools are in effect free-market alternatives to public schools); Faithful, supra note 82, at 
83 (arguing that narrowing the exemption is necessary to over-accommodate religious groups and may 
be narrowed by imposing the antidiscrimination law on to large public organizations that exceed a 
certain employment threshold). 
 188 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121; McConnell, supra note 107, at 255–56 (noting that reli-
gious organizations that operate in the public market are primarily easily and readily identifiable). 
 189 Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121; see Wessels, supra note 17, at 1222; Faithful, supra note 82, 
at 83 (stating that one possible strategy would be to exempt small private organizations and churches 
but still subject large publicly operating organizations to the antidiscrimination laws). 
 190 Compare Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (stating that some large religious organizations 
provide essential humanitarian services and operate in a general public market), with Amos, 483 U.S. 
at 336 (expressing a worry over the circumstantial evaluation of religious beliefs and the rational con-
nection to an organization’s activities). 
 191 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122; Murray, supra note 87, at 226–27 (arguing that a hospital 
should not be able to discriminate against gay doctors and general staff but would still have discretion 
over hiring hospital priests under as a right under the ministerial clause). 
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D. Adopting the Categorical Exclusion to Fully Protect LGBT Access  
to the Employment Market 
Congress should consider narrowing the religious exemption when it re-
visits the ENDA.192 It is evident that under the most recent formulation of the 
ENDA’s religious exemption in the 2013 ENDA, many organizations would be 
exempt based on religious identity or affiliation alone, despite the fact that 
such organizations operate in a non-religious market and perform non-religious 
functions.193 If the next ENDA is to ensure LGBT citizens free access to the 
employment market, then the religious exemption cannot immunize such a 
significant segment of the nation’s employment market through the religious 
institution exemption.194 A categorical limitation for large secular-in-function 
institutions would be an equitable solution to protect the interests of LGBT 
employees who wish to enter secular fields in which a number of employers 
are religiously-affiliated institutions.195 
Under the framework of a categorical exclusion, religiously-owned hospi-
tals, elder care facilities, and healthcare trade schools would be prohibited 
from discriminating against LGBT doctors, nurses, training staff, or general 
maintenance staff.196 Likewise, organizations providing broad humanitarian 
services and welfare assistance to the public at large would be subject to the 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Laura Meckler, Religious Exemptions at Center of ENDA Debate, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2013, 
12:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/11/01/religious-exemptions-at-center-of-enda-debate; 
see Stephens, supra note 143, at 384 (arguing that despite the unlikelihood of the ENDA passing in 
the House, the ENDA is nonetheless an important piece of legislation in need of review); Faithful, 
supra note 82, at 59 (arguing that the religious exemption within the ENDA is an essential provision 
in need of review by Congress). The ACLU is considering lobbying efforts to narrow the scope of the 
ENDA religious exemption so as to better promote the non-discriminatory purpose of the bill when 
Congress inevitably revisits the legislation in the future. Meckler, supra. 
 193 McConnell, supra note 107, at 456; Feldblum, supra note 82, at 115. 
 194 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (as passed 
by Senate November 7, 2013) (stating that the purpose of Act is to address history of employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity); Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique 
Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemp-
tions for Those Who Discriminate Against Married Or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 173, 203 (2012) (stating that the broad exemptions undermine the purpose of nondiscrimina-
tion laws to promote liberty); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 115. 
 195 See Curtis, supra note 196, at 208 (proffering a limited exemption only for churches, minis-
ters, and employers with less than five employees); Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122. 
 196 Compare Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (arguing that large public service institutions should 
not be exempt), and Murray, supra note 87, at 226–27 (arguing for an exemption that does not permit 
hospitals and health care facilities to discriminate against LGBT employees), with Hall v. Baptist 
Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a nursing school with 
Baptist affiliations met the religious institution exemption under Title VII despite training nurses to 
enter the secular medical field), and E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 
1157 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that a nursing home controlled by a Presbyterian company was 
exempt under Title VII despite being open to the public and hiring non-Presbyterian staff). 
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ENDA’s ban of discriminatory employment practices despite the organization’s 
founding under religious ideals.197 Employees similar to former vice principal 
Zmuda would be protected under the ENDA, as the categorical exclusion 
would not permit large educational institutions open to the public to discrimi-
nately hire and fire on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity as to 
their employees whose functions are secular in nature.198 
Additionally, because such a categorical exclusion would apply specifi-
cally to employment practices regarding secular-in-function employees, the 
exclusion would not violate the well-established rule that religious organiza-
tions ought to control their leadership.199 This suggested provision could act in 
conjunction with the common law ministerial exemption so as to permit these 
religious institutions the freedom and discretion to hire religious leadership 
and doctrinally focused instructors.200 For example, divinity schools would 
continue to be exempt from the ENDA because the curricula at such schools 
are directed wholly towards propagation of a particular faith and would only 
offer education to those willing to accept such beliefs.201 The categorical ex-
                                                                                                                           
 197 Compare Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
non-profit organization offering soup kitchen and other welfare services to the poor qualified for a 
Title VII religious exemption because the organization was founded under religious ideals), with 
Feldblum, supra note 82, at 121 (stating once a religious institution enters into the general stream of 
commerce, these enterprises should be required to conform to non-discrimination laws), and Faithful, 
supra note 82, at 81 (arguing that when the quality of a person’s sexuality is unrelated to the work 
performed by the organization, there would be no substantial burden on these organizations to hire 
LGBT employees). 
 198 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (stating religious schools should be exempt to the extent 
that they proffer beliefs inconsistent with acceptance of homosexuality and such schools offer educa-
tion only to those students who want to be indoctrinated with said beliefs); Murray, supra note 87, at 
228–29 (arguing that religious private schools would be exempt to the extent that the teachers or ad-
ministrators are directly involved in communicating religious beliefs but would not be exempt as to 
teachers of a secular curriculum); Paulson, supra note 1 (reporting that Eastside Catholic High School 
is a private school that enrolls individuals of many believes despite the school’s affiliation with Ca-
tholicism). 
 199 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 714 (2012) 
(holding that a church must be free to choose its religious leadership without burden under the First 
Amendment); see Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (agreeing with the general principle that religious 
organizations of all sizes and functions should be able to control its religiously-focused leadership). 
 200 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (providing for a bona fide occupational qualification exemp-
tion); id. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (providing an exemption for religious educational institutions, schools, and 
colleges “if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or insti-
tution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion” (emphasis added)); 
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (carving the ministerial exemption out of the bona fide occupation-
al qualification of Title VII); see Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (proposing that religious organiza-
tions that enter the secular market place and offer general humanitarian services ought to comply with 
non-discrimination except for the hiring of religious leadership and ministers). 
 201 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2); see Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (pointing out that schools such 
as divinity schools or seminaries would continue to be exempt as a result of the nature of their work 
being designed to specifically “inculcate a set of beliefs”); Murray, supra note 87, at 227. 
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clusion would not additionally burden religious institutions, nor would it re-
strict the expression of faith.202 This formulation of the ENDA’s religious ex-
emption, rather, serves to ensure that religious organizations choosing to oper-
ate in a secular and public market have a duty to treat all individuals entering a 
secular labor field equally.203 
CONCLUSION 
Legislation similar to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) 
is certainly a necessary step to carry on the spirit of Title VII and continue the 
fight against employment discrimination. Congress will need to revisit the leg-
islation due to the rampant prejudice and historical pattern of discrimination 
against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) persons in the United 
States. The need to pass the antidiscrimination legislation, however, cannot 
come at the cost of denying LGBT employees protection against religious em-
ployers most prone to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity. This is especially true when religious employers operate in public-
service fields and hire primarily secular-in-function employees. Future designs 
of the ENDA must narrow the religious exemption in order to address secular-
in-function institutions despite any religious founding or oversight. 
Should Congress reintroduce similar legislation, it ought to consider craft-
ing the religious exemption to include a categorical exclusion in order to best 
protect LGBT employees who wish to enter secular markets in which reli-
giously affiliated employers often participate. A categorical exclusion provides 
the most comprehensive balance between promoting employment equality and 
safeguarding the First Amendment rights of religious institutions. The need for 
this legislation is dire as is the need to rework the ENDA’s exemption provi-
sions. After all, the spirit of ENDA legislation advances one simple proposi-
tion: that LGBT employees deserve a fair and equitable opportunity to serve in 
the American job market without limitation. 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122 (arguing that when a religious organization enters the 
public market there are limited circumstances where discriminatory hiring would be reasonably relat-
ed to the expression and articulation of anti-homosexual beliefs). 
 203 See Feldblum, supra note 82, at 122; Faithful, supra note 82, at 81; Murray, supra note 87, at 
238. 
